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FATALISM AND THE OMNITEMPORALITY
OF TRUTH
Richard L. Purtill

In this paper I will show that the omnitemporality of truth does indeed imply fatalism if
the past is unchangeable. I then argue that it is very likely indeed that the past is
unchangeable and thus, since it is very likely that fatalism is false, it is very likely that
the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth is false. I argue that the rejection of the
omnitemporality of truth has no undesirable consequences for either logic or theology,
that in fact the logical and theological consequences of the rejection of the omnitemporality
of truth are beneficial to both disciplines.

I begin with some definitions. By fatalism I mean the doctrine that there is
nothing which we can do now which will make any statement about the future
either true or false. To put it in another way, every future event is beyond our
control if fatalism is true. By the omnitemporality of truth I mean the doctrine
that any statement which is true at any time is true at all times previous to and
all times subsequent to that time. By the unchangeability of the past I mean the
doctrine that there is nothing which we can do now which will make any statement
about the past either true or false, that is, the past is beyond our control.
Given these definitions I argue as follows. Consider some statement about the
future, for example, "Geraldine Ferraro will be the president of the United States
in 1990." Call this statement Fl. Now by the end of 1990 this statement, Fl,
will be either true or its denial will be true. But by the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth this means that either this statement, Fl, or its denial was true
in 1890. The statement, "it was true in 1890 that Geraldine Ferraro would be
president of the United States in 1990," which we will call PI, is a statement
about the past. If this statement, PI, is true, then the statement about the future,
Fl, imbedded in it must be true: the statement about the past, PI, logically
implies the truth of the statement about the future, Fl.
If PI, the statement about the past, is false this does not logically imply that
the statement about the future is false, but there is another statement about the
past which we will call P2. "It was true in 1890 that Geraldine Ferraro would
not be President of the United States in 1990" which does imply the falsity of
our original statement, Fl. Now since PI and P2 are statements about the past
there is nothing I can do now to make them true or false, say, for example, to make
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PI true and P2 false. The truth or falsity of PI and P2 are unchangeable by me,
beyond my control.
Now it seems as clear as anything in logic can be that the logical consequences
of what I cannot change are things I cannot change, that if A is beyond my
control, and B is a logical consequence of A, then B is beyond my control.
Anyone who doubts this logical principle is invited to provide a counter example
to it which is coherent, much less plausible.
Since the truth or falsity of Fl is a logical consequence of the truth or falsity
of PI and P2, and since the truth or falsity of PI and P2, being in the past, is
beyond my control, then the truth or falsity of Fl is beyond my control: nothing
I can do now will make FI either true or false. Since it seems clear that a similar
argument will hold true for any combination of persons there is nothing any of
us alone or in cooperation can do to make Fl true or false. Thus it would seem
pointless to debate, deliberate, plan or campaign for the election of Ms. Ferraro:
nothing we can do now will make it true or false that she will be president in 1990.
Since the same argument applies to any statement about the future, it is in
general as pointless to debate, deliberate, plan, or strive for any future result as
it is to do these things about the past: the future is as much beyond our control
as the past. Put briefly, given the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth, the
totality of true statements about the future is a logical consequence of the totality
of the true statements about the past. Since I cannot now bring about the truth
or falsity of any statement about the past I cannot now bring about the truth or
falsity of any statement about the future. The principle that makes the totality
of statements about the future a logical consequence of the totality of the statements about the past is the principle of the omnitemporality of truth. Thus, as
I promised, I have shown that if the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth is
true, then if the past is unchangeable then fatalism is true. I
However, some philosophers would raise the following objection to the argument I have just given. There are two kinds of facts about the past: hard facts
which cannot be changed and soft facts which can be changed. 2 An example of
a hard fact is that Lincoln was assassinated: nothing can now change that truth
about the past. But the past truth or falsity of statements about the future such
as "Geraldine Ferraro will be President of the United States in 1990" depends
on what happens in the future and can in that sense be changed by what happens
in the future. Backward causation may be impossible, but "backwards epistemological dependence" is not. Thus a key premise of the argument, that past
facts cannot be changed, fails and so the argument as a whole fails.
My difficulty with this reply is to see just what is meant by a "soft fact" about
the past. So far as I can see there are two possible interpretations and the crux
between them can be illustrated in this way: Suppose that in 1890 God makes
a list of all true statements about occupants of the U.S. Presidency. "Lincoln
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was assassinated in 1865" would certainly appear on this list. But would either
"Geraldine Ferraro will be president of the U. S. in 1990" or "Geraldine Ferraro
will not be president of the U. S. in 1990" be on this list? If the answer to this
is "no" then we have what I will call the retrospective view of soft facts, which
is the view that as soon as a statement becomes true we should retrospectively
list it among statements which were true in the past. The retrospective view
seems to me to be implausible but harmless.
On the other hand, if we say that either "Geraldine Ferraro will be president
of the U.S. in 1990" or "Geraldine Ferraro will not be president of the U.S. in
1990" would be on that list in 1890 we have to ask if it ever happens that
whichever of the two statements was on the list is later replaced by the other
statement. If the answer is "no" I simply fail to see any distinction between hard
and soft facts about the past. Since the statement was true or false, and it never
changes its truth value, what is meant by saying that it could change its truth
value? If the answer is "yes" we get what I call the revisionist view of soft facts
which seems to me less harmless but even less plausible than the retrospective
view.
On the retrospective view the list of statements which were true in 1890 is
constantly growing. On the revisionist view the list of statements which were
true in 1890 is constantly changing. The first view undermines my argument
only in the sense that it trivializes the omnitemporality of truth; we now mean
so little by saying that statements are always true if true at all that no fatalistic
consequences can be derived. The second view rejects the omnitemporality of
truth in that true statements can change their truth value. But this view seems
much less plausible than the common sense view 1 now wish to state.
On this view, the past is indeed unchangeable, but the future is not. Some
statements about the future are indeed true (or false) now and always have been.
(As a theist I believe that "God will exist in 1990" is among these statements,
as well as many omnitemporally true statements in logic, mathematics and
metaphysics.) However other statements about the future are not now either true
or false: they have a probability between zero and one. This probability varies
from day to day, indeed very likely from instant to instant. (I am inclined to
believe that the probability of FI increased after Ms. Ferraro's debate with
George Bush and decreased when she made her Pepsi commercial, but I may
be wrong.) By the end of 1990, the probability of Fl will be either one or zero:
it will be either true or false. Thus there are no true statements like PI and P2,
and when Fl becomes true or false, it has no effect at all on what was true or
false in 1890.'
I believe that this view of the matter is true, and that it is, as I have said, a
commonsensical view. Indeed I believe that it is presupposed in almost everything
most of us say or do about the future, and that fatalism in practice is just as
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impossible as fundamental skepticism in practice. (These are among my reasons
for thinking the view is true.)
If one looks for arguments in favor of the doctrine of the omnitemporality of
truth these seem of be of two kinds: first, the claim that it is a presupposition
of logic, and, second, that rejecting the omnitemporality of truth will lead to
certain undesirable consequences in logic or theology. As to the first claim, it
may be true that logic as standardly taught and practiced does make the assumption
that truth is omnitemporal. But then standard logic makes all sorts of simplifying
assumptions in order to get on with its major concerns, and when we try to apply
standard logic to ordinary language and real-life problems we often have to
re-examine and reject these simplifying assumptions. When we use logic for
meta-mathematics it is quite safe to assume the omnitemporality of truth, for
mathematical truths are omnitemporally true, but when we use logic for
metaphysics it would be well to carefully examine such assumptions, for our
logical practice should not prejudice any metaphysical question; logic must be
metaphysically neutral or it becomes bad (because unacknowledged) metaphysics.
The most common allegation about the bad consequences of abandoning the
principle of the omnitemporality of truth is that if we abandon the omnitemporality
of truth we lose the principle of excluded middle: "(pv - p)" Proponents of the
omnitemporality of truth ask rhetorically what we are to make of statements
about the future which are not true, but not false either. Surely if a statement is
not true it must be false, or at least nonsensical. And surely "Geraldine Ferraro
will be the U. S. President in 1990" is not nonsensical.
However, this neglects a distinction which is the very pons asinorum of this
topic; the distinction between the principle of excluded middle and the principle
of bivalence. To make the distinction clear it is only necessary to examine
Probability Theory. In standard Probability Theory the principle of excluded
middle holds, in the form: "Pr (pv - p) = 1 for all values of p." However the
principle of bivalence, which would have the form, "p has the value 0 if and
only if it does not have the value of 1" is simply false in standard probability
theory. In fact if we insert that assumption, probability theory simply collapses
into standard propositional logic. Propositional logic is a special case of probability theory, or if you prefer, probability theory is an extension of propositional
logic.
Confusion is sometimes caused by the fact that in any finite valued multi-valued
logic we do lose some of the theorems of propositional logic. However in
probability theory, which is an infinite valued multi-valued logic, every theorem
of standard propositional logic is preserved. (This is not always ad advantage:
the principle of Addition, "p implies p or q," which is responsible for a good
deal of the lack of fit between propositional logic and ordinary reasoning, is also
preserved.)
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Thus the positive benefit to logic of rejecting the principle of the omnitemporality of truth is that it reminds us that propositional logic is only a special limited
case of a wider system, and can be used only where certain limiting conditions
apply Uust as ordinary addition of velocities is only a special case of Einsteinian
addition of velocities, which can be used where speeds are much less than the
speed of light).
Of course the availability of an infinite valued logic does not in any way settle
the question of whether the omnitemporality of truth is an acceptable metaphysical
principle. All it does is to remove one objection to abandoning the principle, an
objection based on a false absolutism as to the metaphysical presuppositions of
"logic." Whether or not the principle of excluded middle is a presupposition of
any coherent logic, the principle of bivalence certainly is not.
I now tum to the alleged theological consequences of rejecting the omnitemporality of truth. In traditional Christian theology God is seen as omniscient: He
knows every true statement. Traditionally this has been thought to include a
detailed set of true statements about the future: every detail of the future has
been thought to be present to God. The idea that many statements about the
future are neither true nor false but have only a certain probability, seems to run
counter to this picture. Surely, a traditional theist might say, God knows the
truth as to whether Ms. Ferraro will be president in 1990. But you claim that
there is now no truth of the matter, so how can God know it?
The short answer is the He does not. God knows the truth of all true statements,
the falsity of all false statements and the probability of all statements which are
neither true or false. Thus He knows the exact probability that Ms. Ferraro will
be president in 1990, but He does not know that she will be nor that she won't
be. There is no such fact to know, and thus it is not a limitation of God's
omniscience not to know it.
I will consider three objections to this from the point of view of traditional
Christian theism. The first objection is that this view goes against a long tradition
of Christian teaching. But I am not at all sure that this is true. The Christian
God is the God of History, Who interacts with human beings, Who responds to
prayer and penance. There has always been a tension between this idea and the
static conception of God which came into Christian theology from Neoplatonic
philosophy. T think that every Biblical passage and every Christian tradition
about God's knowledge of the future is quite consistent with the view that some
statements about the future are neither true nor false and thus are not known by
God to be true or false. Those who think otherwise are challenged to produce
such a Biblical passage or Christian tradition.
Certainly God is pictured in scripture and tradition as knowing some facts
about the future, and this brings us to the second objection; the objection from
prophecy. Certainly in scripture and Christian tradition God and His representa-
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tives are pictured as knowing that certain things would occur in the future, and
making prophecies about these things. But this is certainly quite compatible with
the view that many statements about the future are neither true or false. Some
future events may be already "present in their causes," that is, may be inevitable
unless God miraculously intervenes. Some events may be things which God is
determined to bring about and of course has the power to bring about. But that
some future events are inevitable does not mean that all are.
I would argue that the best model of the future is that of a network of offbranching and interconnecting paths. A given future event may lie ahead on
every available path but the paths to and from that event may be very different
depending on what choices are made. For instances, it might have been inevitable
that Christ would be put to death but the manner of His death might have been
very different if Pilate or the Jewish authorities had made different decisions.
At some point it might have been inevitable that Judas would betray Christ, but
he might, like Peter, have repented immediately and become a great saint. But
at any rate there seems to be no argument from prophecy to the view that God
has a detailed knowledge of every future event.
Finally it might be objected that to say that God does not have a detailed
knowledge of every future event is to denigrate the power of God, disrespectfully
or even blasphemously. However it is not really respectful of God to attribute
to Him impossible powers: to say that He can make a square circle or a weight
which He cannot lift. If the future is not "there" to know, so to speak, then
saying that God knows it anyway is just as silly as saying that God is so powerful
that He can make a circle with comers.
There are certainly alternative views about God's knowledge of the future
which should be respectfully considered, for instance, the Boethean view that
God is outside of time and sees rather than foresees the future. There seem to
me to be two major difficulties about the Boethian view. The first is the difficulty
raised by Norman Kretzmann in 1966;4 that on this view it is difficult if not
impossible to give any sense to the notion of God knowing what state the universe
is in now. So if knowing what state the universe is in now is an important fact
then there is an important fact which God does not know. But if the idea of the
universe being in a certain state now is not an important fact, but merely an
illusion caused by human perspective, we have surely arrived at a "block universe"
view which is fatalistic.
The second major difficulty about the Boethian view is that it is difficult on
this view to see how there can be any genuine interaction between us and God.
We ordinarily think of God as acting in response to certain actions of ours,
which occur in time. I pray and in response God answers my prayer. I ask for
God's forgiveness and in response God forgives me. God's responses we think
of as taking place after my action and in some sense because of my action (my
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action is a condition of the response, though it does not determine the response).
Now on the Boethean view God sees everything that ever has happened, or ever
will happen in one "eternal now." He responds to this "seeing" with one eternal
action which we perceive as a number of distant actions taking place in time.
There is, no doubt, some sense in which this one eternal action is in part a
response to my prayer at a given time, to my repentance at a given time. But
to a considerable extent we lose the sense that we are interacting with God.'
There may be ways out of both difficulties, but until we see what these are
it seems to me that the Boethian view is less credible than the competing view
that we have sketched.
And to counterattack on this point of respect for God's power, it seems to me
that an active and dynamic picture of God, a God who providentially guides His
creation along the branching paths of possibility is far more religiously adequate
than the static Neoplatonic conception. To say that God is the Lord of History
is to say that His power shapes and molds a dynamic changing world. Even the
Boethian view seems open to the objection that interaction between God and
history is only apparent: all God's actions must somehow be one action done in
His "eternal now."
I would go further and say that the conception of a God who merely contemplates in an "eternal now" a future which is totally present to Him is religiously
less adequate than the picture of a "venturing God" who acts to bring about a
perilous good, a good that might fail to happen.
To conclude, I think that the logical and theological objections to the idea of
an open future where every detail is not settled share a common characteristic;
a sort of metaphysical timidity. Logic can deal quite well with the notion of
infinite possibilities: it does not need to confine itself to statements which are
now or always true or false. And a theology which insists that for God every
detail must be cut and dried owes less to respect for God than it owes to the
limitations of the believers' imaginations. Both logic and theology attempt to
capture something too great for them in formulas and definitions. Life will always
be larger than logic. God will always be greater than theology. But there is no
need to artificially limit either our logic or our theology, to exaggerate their
inadequacy by unnecessary limitations.
Western Washington University

NOTES
1. Similar arguments have been given by other philosophers, e.g., Richard Sorabji Time, Creation
and the Continuum (Ithaca, N. Y. Cornell University Press, 1983) pp. 132-35 and 255-56.
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My own version of this argument is designed to bring out the part played in the argument by the
unchangeability of the past, the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth, and the way in which the
unchangeability carries over from statements about the past to statements about the future which
they imply.
2. One of the best recent discussions of this distinction is "Hard and Soft Facts" by Joshua Hoffman
and Gary Rosenkrantz, (Philosophical Review, July 1984) which contains the necessary references
to earlier discussions. Oddly enough, however, the discussion has mainly centered around the
definition of hard and soft facts and the key issue of what we mean by saying that soft facts about
the past can be changed has largely been lost sight of.
3. Philosophical defenders of this view include Aristotle (in On Interpretation Ch. 9) and some of
the medieval philosophers, but until the formulation of a precise mathematical theory of probabilities
it was not possible to adequately state our common sense intuitions on this point. Modem defenders
(for very different reasons) of an "open future" view include Charles Hartshorne, C. D. Broad and
Arthur Prior. Such originality as is possessed by my own formulation lies in bringing out the
probabilistic element in the view, and its implications.
4. Norman Kretzmann, "Omniscience and Immutability" Journal of Philosophy 63, July 14, 1966.
See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, "God Everlasting" in Orlebeke and Smedes (eds.) God and the Good
(Grand Rapids, MI, William B. Eerdman Publishing Company, 1975).
5. See William P. Alston, "Divine Human Dialogue and the Nature of God," Faith and Philosophy
Vol. 2, No. I, January 1985, for an excellent defense of the Boethian view. But Alston himself
mentions "those undoubtedly numerous persons who have failed to be convinced" by his arguments.
The present paperis an explanation and defense of what Alston calls the "intermediate view" (p. 17).

